Goals
2. Create legislative supervision for all cross strait trade deals.
3. Create citizens' constitutional conference
Time period
Country
Location City/State/Province
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Methods in 2nd segment
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Methods in 6th segment
Additional methods (Timing Unknown)
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Leaders
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Involvement of social elites
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Campaigner violence
Repressive Violence
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Groups in 3rd Segment
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Survival
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Database Narrative
Taiwanese independence has been an important issue in East Asia since the country was established in 1949. Cross-strait tensions between China and Taiwan created tension within Taiwan. The two major political parties in Taiwan, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), hold opposite positions on how the country should handle their relationship with China. The Kuomintang are a conservative, Chinese nationalist party that ruled in China for 20 years before leaving for Taiwan. The Democratic Progressive Party is the center-left Taiwan nationalist party that was created as an alternative party to the KMT in response to nearly a century of KMT leadership in Taiwan. The competing ideals between the two parties led to increased political tensions and unrest in Taiwan.
In June 2013, China and Taiwan signed the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA). This treaty determined what Chinese corporations could do in Taiwan and what Taiwanese corporations could do in China. Many students and academics in Taiwan believed the treaty would hurt the economy in Taiwan by increasing China’s sphere of influence on the island. The Taiwanese legislature agreed to hold 16 public hearings regarding the treaty, eight for each party. The KMT held their hearings in late 2013 shortly after the treaty was signed, but the DPP did not hold any until the period allotted by the Taiwanese legislature expired. KMT legislators were adamant that the treaty could not be amended, resulting in months of gridlock. On March 17, 2014, the KMT, led by President Ma and Premier Jiang attempted a unilateral move to enact the CSSTA without proper review.
Students and protesters immediately resisted the KMT’s action. At 9:00 pm the next day, hundreds of students, civic leaders, academics, and others climbed the fence of the legislature and entered the building. The protesters broke windows and injured one police officer on their path to the legislative floor, which they occupied overnight. Six protesters were arrested by Taiwanese police on the first night, while over 300 remained and resisted police officers’ attempts to remove them from the legislature. The protesters vowed to occupy the floor until March 21, when the vote was set to occur. The government cut water and electricity to the building, and KMT Premier Jiang ordered riot police to remove the protesters, but the police did not follow the order.
After just one night, thousands of protesters organized outside of the legislature. Around 3,000 riot police surrounded them, while KMT Speaker Wang promised to refrain from using violence against protesters. Speaker Wang, known to seek bipartisan solutions to political issues, refused to speak with President Ma on March 21, and rather, urged politicians to listen to the protestors and agree to a bipartisan review of the CSSTA. President Ma and Premier Jiang stood firm in their plan and ratified the treaty in a press conference.
In response to President Ma’s press conference, a group of protesters led by Dennis Wei passed through barricades and made a move from the legislature to the Executive Yuan on March 23, which they occupied from 7:30 pm to 5:00 am. Police responded to this charge with batons and water cannons, injuring 150 protesters and arresting 61 protestors. Police ordered journalists and medics to leave as the police continued to forcibly remove protesters until early in the morning.
On March 25, four days after the vote was scheduled to occur, President Ma finally agreed to negotiate with student protesters, who thought President Ma was controlling the KMT, forcing all cross-party legislation to fail. Ma invited student leaders including Lin Fei-fan, who proposed the idea of a new, broad legislation that supervises all cross-strait trade agreements. The students wrote their own legislation the next day and asked politicians to sign it in support.
Lin Fei-fan and other students held a rally on 30 March in the street just outside of President Ma’s office. With over 500,000 protesters, the rally was the largest protest in Taiwan’s history. Over twenty non-governmental organizations took part in the rally as well. KMT supporters organized a small opposition rally at the same time, but there was no conflict between the two, and the opposition left before the larger group.
On April 6, almost 20 days after the occupation began, Speaker Wang visited students in the Legislative Yuan. He promised to hold off on review of the CSSTA until a broader cross-strait trade review process was implemented. Many KMT legislators became unhappy with Speaker Wang, commenting that he should have consulted the party before making his promise to the protestors. On April 7, the students agreed to end their occupation of the Yuan on April 10. The protesters left the Yuan on 10 April 2014 with support from President Ma. The Yuan was left completely clean by the students.
Legal disputes between protesters and the state lasted for years beyond the Sunflower Movement campaign, with many protesters sued and charged for obstruction of justice by the government. Protesters sued KMT Premier Jiang and police officials for attempted murder, coercion, and bodily harm. The KMT Party lost important elections in the following years due to lack of trust in the party and higher voter turnout from DPP voters. When DPP President Tsai Ing-wen was elected, she dropped all remaining charges against protesters.
The Taiwanese government did not ratify the CSSTA in 2014, making the Sunflower Movement a successful campaign in securing its goal to stop the agreement. The campaign helped Taiwan deter Chinese influence from expanding on the island, an important achievement in protecting Taiwanese independence.
Influences
The Sunflower Movement was influenced by the 1990 Wild Lily protests for democracy that took place in Taipei, Taiwan.
Sources
Anon. 2024. “Sunflower Student Movement.” Wikipedia. Retrieved October 1, 2024 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunflower_Student_Movement)
Chau, Thompson. n.d. “Taiwan’s Sunflower Protest Legacy Looms Large for Incoming President Lai.” Nikkei Asia, April 30. Retrieved October 1, 2024 (https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/Taiwan-s-Sunflower-protest-legacy-looms-large-for-incoming-president-Lai).
Cole, J. Michael. 2014. “Was Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement Successful?” The Diplomat, July 1. Retrieved October 1, 2024 (https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/was-taiwans-sunflower-movement-successful/).
discoversociety. 2014. “On the Frontline: Democracy at 4am – Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement.” Discover Society, May 6. Retrieved October 1, 2024 (https://archive.discoversociety.org/2014/05/06/on-the-frontline-democracy-at-4am-taiwans-sunflower-movement/).
Ho, Ming-sho. 2018. “The Activist Legacy of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2. Retrieved October 1, 2024 (https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/08/the-activist-legacy-of-taiwans-sunflower-movement?lang=en).
Laskai, Lorand. 2014. “The Transformation of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement.” The Diplomat, May 5. Retrieved October 1, 2024 (https://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-transformation-of-taiwans-sunflower-movement/).
Moura, Nelson, and Yunjie Zou. 2014. “Taiwanese Protesters Plot next Steps after Ending Parliament Occupation.” Waging Nonviolence, April 15. Retrieved October 1, 2024 (https://wagingnonviolence.org/2014/04/taiwanese-protesters-plot-next-steps-ending-parliament-occupation/).
Smith, Glenn. 2015. “Taiwan’s Sunflower Revolution: One Year Later - FPIF.” Foreign Policy In Focus, May 7. Retrieved October 1, 2024 (https://fpif.org/taiwans-sunflower-revolution-one-year-later/).
Wasserstrom, Jeffrey. 2014. “Taiwan’s Sunflower Protests: A Q&A with Shelley Rigger.” Dissent Magazine, April 11. Retrieved October 1, 2024 (https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/taiwans-sunflower-protests-a-qa-with-shelley-rigger/).