Belarusians protest against President Lukashenko's sixth term, 2020

Goals

To implement a legitimately democratic presidential election, to depose Lukashenko, and to secure the release of all Belarusians imprisoned for opposing the current government. Beginning in Segment 4, to acknowledge Sviatlana Tsikhanouski as the winning candidate in accordance with a truthful electoral process.

The campaign initially appears to be defensive, as many of the demands called for the protection of human rights, freedom of speech, and fair elections. However, Belarus only had three years in between its independence from the Soviet Union and Lukashenko’s rise to power. Therefore, democratic elections were not standard or the status quo. By calling for democratic elections, Belarusians were not defending a democratic institution they already had, but rather, seeking to establish one in the first place.

Time period notes

The campaign began on 6 May, the day that police arrested Sergei Tsikhanouski and his supporters mobilized protests. The initial goals were to secure the release of Sergei Tsikhanouski and other political prisoners. However, as the August presidential election loomed closer, the campaign’s goals expanded to the deposition of Lukashenko and the implementation of fair electoral processes. For this reason, the start date is in early May, even though wider demands weren’t expressed until later in the month.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya's parallel government, a result of the campaign to remove Lukashenko, continues as of November 2024. However, it operates on the international rather than domestic stage, since Tsikhanouskaya's cabinet consists of exiled dissidents, who can never return to Belarus. The campaign itself ended when Lukashenko's government repressed a general strike and demobilized the movement.

Time period

6 May 2020 to 29 October 2020

Country

Belarus

Location City/State/Province

Minsk

Location Description

The protests were centralized in Minsk, the capital of Belarus, but they occured throughout the entire country.
Jump to case narrative

Additional methods (Timing Unknown)

Segment Length

Approximately 29.5 days

Notes on Methods

Details on method for “Wearing of symbols” in Segments 1 and 3: The protestors wore masks not only to prevent the spread of COVID, but also to symbolically defy and condemn Lukashenko’s refusal to acknowledge the pandemic and its impact on Belarusians.

Details on method for “Declarations by organizations and institutions” in Segments 1 and 5: A pledge drive, while not considered a method of nonviolent protest in and of itself, functioned as a declaration of intent in this context. By Belarusians using mass signatures to display their commitment to vote for Sviatlana, they are essentially promising a future protest. Lukashenko criminalized any opposition to his leadership, as well as any support for the opposing person/group. Although this action is not a protest under a functioning democracy, it became one in response to Lukashenko’s strategies of repression.

Leaders

Sergei Tsikhanouskaya, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Maxim Znak, Maryia Maroz, Kiryl Halanau, Uladzislau Sakalousk, Maryya Kalesnikava

Partners

Kiryl Halanau, Uladzislau Sakalousk

External allies

The European Union, European Parliament, Lithuanian government

Involvement of social elites

Peter Stano, Josep Borrel

Opponents

Alexander Lukashenko, the loyalists/allies in his administration, and the state police

Campaigner violence

Not known

Repressive Violence

Belarusian police systematically utilized violence as an attempt to repress the protests. This included beatings, rubber bullets, tear gas, stun grenades, withholding of food and water, rape, and threatening violence against loved ones.

Cluster

Democracy
Human Rights

Classification

Change

Groups in 1st Segment

European Union
Peter Stano
Sviatlana’s supporters

Groups in 4th Segment

Government of Lithuania
European Parliament

Groups in 5th Segment

Josep Borrell

Segment Length

Approximately 29.5 days

Success in achieving specific demands/goals

2 out of 6 points

Survival

0.5 out of 1 points

Growth

1 out of 3 points

Total points

3.5 out of 10 points

Database Narrative

Alexander Lukashenko first assumed office as the president of Belarus in 1994. In the years to follow, he consolidated his power through increasingly authoritarian rule. Although the government held presidential elections to re-appoint Lukashenko for each subsequent term, according to third-party analysts and the international community, the process was fraudulent and provided no genuine opportunity for opposition. It was not until the August 2020 presidential election that Belarusians voiced opposition on a massive, organized scale. Resentment towards Lukashenko’s rule festered particularly in the context of a failing economy, repression of dissent, and a mismanaged pandemic. Belarus experienced a particularly high rate of Coronavirus infections, in part due to Lukashenko’s refusal to acknowledge the pandemic as legitimate.

In May 2020, an unlikely Lukashenko challenger emerged – not on traditional news channels, but on social media. Sergei Tsikhanouski [author’s note: Sergei and his wife, Sviatlana, will be referred to by their first rather than last names for clarity purposes] gained a large YouTube following (around 140,000 subscribers at the time), by conducting casual interviews with Belarusians critical of Lukashenko. Sergei’s interviewees spoke of lack of economic or political freedom under the present administration. Through social media, Sergei discovered a venue not controlled by the state, through which opposition was more difficult to extinguish. Sergei’s videos received more views than Belarusian media, creating a source of popular power that threatened Lukashenko’s control.

Sergei popularized a demeaning symbol of resistance against Lukashenko on his YouTube channel. He nicknamed Lukashenko "the cockroach," joking that Lukashenko resembled the cockroach from a well-known children's cartoon titled "The Mighty Cockroach." While traveling for his videos, Sergei drove with a large slipper on top of his car – the preferred weapon for squashing household pests, like cockroaches.

Eleven days before the deadline to register candidacy for the upcoming presidential election, on 7 May, Sergei announced to his YouTube followers that he planned to challenge Lukashenko. Before Sergei submitted his candidacy documents, he was arrested on 6 May under the charge of participating in an unauthorized rally against Lukashenko in 2019. The government sentenced him to a delayed 15-day detainment.

That same day, dozens of his supporters held protests demanding his release and accusing the police of unlawful detainment. These rallies continued for three days. Although these protests were mobilized by Sergei’s arrest, during this period, authorities detained and fined more than 100 of Sergei’s supporters. On 12 May, EU Foreign Service representative Peter Stano condemned the Belarusian authorities and reaffirmed Sergei’s right to free assembly and association. Stano called for Sergei’s immediate release and for all charges to be dropped.

With the deadline for candidacy documents fast approaching, and Sergei’s detainment ongoing, Sviatlana submitted the presidential candidacy documents on behalf of her husband on 14 May. The Central Electoral Board rejected the bid. Sviatlana responded by submitting documents for her own candidacy, and the board did not reject her submission, most likely viewing Sviatlana as less of a threat than her husband. Sviatlana was an English teacher with no prior public engagement in politics or activism.

The authorities released Sergei on 20 May, but he remained ineligible to run for the presidency, due to his open criticism of Lukashenko. At the time, Sviatlana and Sergei both believed the campaign to be Sergei's. Sviatlana retreated into the shadows, but nevertheless, Sergei grew frustrated by her name, rather than his, on the ticket.

Dissatisfaction with Lukashenko was not a new phenomenon. However, the emergence of a genuine, non-puppet alternative – Sergei or Sviatlana – channeled long-standing resentment into a real campaign. On 24 May, 1,000 people participated in a protest against Lukashenko. The demands made by the protestors included the release of all political prisoners, freedom to speak out against the government without fear, and fair elections. Many in attendance carried slippers to symbolize support for Sergei, who mobilized the movement but was subsequently barred from campaigning. To protest Lukashenko's denial of the significance of Coronavirus, most of the protestors wore masks and socially distanced themselves. Attendees also pledged in writing to support Sviatlana's bid for the presidency.

Although police did not intervene in the 24 May protest, between 6 May and 13 May, police had arrested more than 100 protestors, journalists, and government critics. It is unknown why there was no police response to this particular action.

Sergei Tsikhanouski was arrested again shortly after he was collecting signatures for his wife's campaign on 29 May in the city of Hrodna. The Belarusian government accused him of inciting riots and political chaos through his YouTube and Telegram channels. The police charged Sergei and seven other canvassers with Article 432 of Belarus' Criminal Code – organizing an event with intent to disrupt public order. 

On 2 June, as voters lined up once again to pledge their votes for opposition candidates, such as Sviatlana, they waved slippers, representing their vote "squashing" the cockroach. Lukashenko’s government heavily restricted any public displays of support for opposition candidates, including written voter pledges, but that did not stop thousands of Belarusians from doing so. 

Sviatlana’s campaign gained momentum. Although her presidency bid began to demonstrate support for Sergei and continue his protest against Lukashenko, it became clear that authorities were not planning on releasing Sergei any time soon. While Sergei wanted to run purely for protest, Sviatlana unintentionally generated support that went beyond a symbolic threat – she became a real candidate. After Sergei was arrested again, Belarus declared Sviatlana the opposition leader, rather than simply a stand-in for her husband.

On 2 August, 20,000 of her supporters gathered in the city of Brest for a campaign rally. Posters and chants reiterated messages of optimism: "We Believe! We Love! We Can! We Shall Win!” Protestors flew white-and-red flags, a historic emblem of anti-government sentiment in Belarus. When activists spoke to the crowd, they demanded the release of political prisoners, and also encouraged the participants to vote on 9 August, rather than electing to early vote. Sviatlana’s supporters planned to arrive at the voting booths wearing white bracelets for solidarity.

One day before the election, 6 August, thousands gathered for a protest in Minsk, in response to the government declaring that Sviatlana’s campaign rallies would be replaced with government-led events. Demonstrators marched through the streets chanting the slogans "Long Live Belarus" and "Go Away!", the latter referring to Lukashenko and calling for his deposition. 

Simultaneously, sound engineers Kiryl Halanau and Uladzislau Sakalouski disrupted the music playlist at a pro-Lukashenko event. Halanau and Sakalouski, both campaigning for Sviatlana, played the Soviet-era song "We Want Changes" by Viktor Tsoi. Besides the fact that this song was not included in the official line-up, it is also known within Belarus as a revolutionary, rallying cry – one that was already associated with Sviatlana’s run for office. In fact, the song was featured in one of her campaign’s video advertisements. The next day, police detained Halanau and Sakalouski on charges of disobedience. 

On 9 August, the Belarusian government held the election as planned. Despite the massive demonstrations of support shown by Sviatlana’s supporters, the results were similar to those of the past five terms – a Lukashenko win. This time, he claimed that he had won eighty percent of the vote. The blatant fraud outraged Belarusians, who returned to the streets demanding the government recount their votes.

Sviatlana, also shocked by her apparent defeat, released statements that called for all protests to remain peaceful. However, police reacted violently to protests against the false election results. From 9 August to 12 August, authorities detained 7,000 protestors and killed at least three. Security used excessive force, such as rubber bullets, tear gas, and stun grenades. Prison guards physically and sexually assaulted detainees, as well as denied them basic necessities, such as food and water.

Meanwhile, Sviatlana met with government officials to protest the results; these officials promptly told her to either leave the country or risk her life. Shortly after she and several of her aides fled to Lithuania, Sviatlana announced herself the legitimate leader of Belarus. While the demonstrations in Belarus continued, she toured throughout Europe, meeting with heads of state to create alliances. Ten days after Sviatlana implored the Council of Europe not to engage with Lukashenko, the European Parliament voted not to recognize Lukashenko’s government after the end of his current term.

In order to provide the international community with an alternative to Lukashenko and reinforce her own legitimacy, Sviatlana created a Coordination Council to facilitate Belarus’ transitional government post-Lukashenko.

The continued rallies and mounting level of unrest in Belarus meant that Lukashenko’s own declaration of victory contradicted the reality of his (lack of) popular support. On 17 August, Lukashenko visited the Minsk Wheel Tractor Factory to solicit support from its workers. The workers responded by yelling at him to leave.

Josep Borrell, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security in the EU, released a statement on 15 September declaring that the EU did not recognize Lukashenko as the legitimate leader of Belarus. The United States Department of the Treasury enacted sanctions on 2 October, highlighting in their press release the fraudulent August election and continuous violence towards protestors. 

By 25 October, Lukashenko had not responded to any of the campaign’s demands – the most crucial being that he resign and release all political prisoners. To increase the pressure, Sviatlana organized a strike in Belarus from outside its borders. Factory workers and university students participated by choosing not to work, instead flying white-and-red flags in defiance. Police detained 380 people on the first day alone. 

With Sviatlana in Lithuania and most opposition leaders jailed, protesting in Belarus became significantly more risky, and the domestic campaign disintegrated. 

Although the campaign was unsuccessful in achieving its stated goals (deposing Lukashenko, holding free and fair elections, and securing the release of all political prisoners), it had a massive international impact. Due to Sviatlana's work in Lithuania, as well as the demonstrations inside Belarus, most EU countries do not recognize the legitimacy of Lukashenko's rule. His hold on power did not entirely crumble, but the pillars of support shook to an extent unseen in his prior 26 years of leadership. For this reason, there is an unprecedented success to this campaign that can't be evaluated within these parameters.

Sources

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Name of researcher, and date dd/mm/yyyy

Peyton Davis 06/11/2024